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who were targets of the kamikazes as
well. The final chapter, “The Moon
Rose Radiant,” presents the immediate postconflict stand-down and the
responses of surviving kamikaze pilots.
The kamikaze attacks were operational
and strategic failures, but their tactical
effects, at least psychologically, were
enormous. These warriors left a legacy
to be studied and compared with those
of other wars and other suicide warriors.
Readers interested in the personal side
and stories of the pilots will want to
supplement this volume by reading
Kamikaze Diaries: Reflections of Japanese
Student Soldiers by Emiko OhnukiTierney (University of Chicago Press,
2006) and Blossoms in the Wind: Human
Legacies of the Kamikaze by M. G.
Sheftall (NAL Caliber / Penguin, 2005).
Also not to be overlooked is the classic
1958 account by Rikihei Inoguchi and
Tadashi Nakajima, with Roger Pineau,
The Divine Wind: Japan’s Kamikaze Force
in World War II (Naval Institute Press,
repr. 2013). Yet for a first book to read
on the subject, Stewart’s Kamikaze is
very good and insightful. The separate
index of Australian, British, Japanese,
and U.S. ships is very helpful, as is
his discussion of the oft-overlooked
attacks against Australian and British
ships. It is well worth reading.
TIMOTHY J. DEMY

British Naval Intelligence through the Twentieth
Century, by Andrew Boyd. Barnsley, U.K.: Seaforth, 2020. 800 pages. $52.95.

In a most-welcome study of British intelligence bureaucracies in the modern
age, Andrew Boyd has provided a major
contribution to the historiography of

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons,

maritime strategy. His single-volume
history provides a comprehensive,
chronological analysis of the relevant
administrative trends and key personalities and reveals many fresh insights into
the contemporary question of British
intelligence. Responding to the standard
historiographical narratives, Boyd
challenges many myths and provides
corrective observations for his readers
to consider. He examines the secret
history of the British Empire while
simultaneously considering the role of
the Dominions and Commonwealth.
From the late nineteenth century to
the present, British naval strategy has
evolved under the influence of intelligence. The bureaucracies involved
largely have remained behind closed
doors, yet intelligence organizations
have helped to define the world
into the twenty-first century.
Boyd draws from original documentary
sources—archival holdings, contemporaneous firsthand accounts, and
memoirs—to address critical problems
in the official histories and other
historiography of British intelligence,
including addressing the major myths.
Historiographical trends in recent
scholarship have muddied the waters,
and thankfully Boyd has addressed
them. By taking the chronological
approach, he has provided a better
interpretation of the bigger questions, explaining why people in the
past acted as they did at the time.
Among many other examples, Boyd
demonstrates the influence of the First
World War on efforts to renew the
transatlantic relationship between the
British Empire and the United States.
Boyd then uses this history to correct
many popular myths surrounding the
heroic story of British code breakers

1

Naval War College Review, Vol. 75 [], No. 1, Art. 12

and the role of Bletchley Park in
shaping Allied strategy in the Second
World War. He then applies this history
further to offer additional corrective
historical observations about the
character and organization of British
intelligence in the twenty-first century.
The fictions Boyd corrects frequently
highlighted chosen facts in the historiography of British intelligence. The
foreword remarks, provided by historian
Andrew Lambert, serve as a foundation
for Boyd to address those myths by
providing a detailed examination of
the applicable documentary sources.
Placing the myths in question into the
broader context, Boyd also introduces
his readers to the historical personalities most responsible for influencing
popular portrayals of his subject.
For example, Boyd examines former
intelligence operative turned popular
fiction writer Hector C. Bywater and his
“strange intelligence” of the First World
War era. Building from this analysis,
Boyd then tackles the actual history of
Commander Ian Fleming, RNVR, to
offer a fresh glimpse behind the curtains
of British intelligence into the Second
World War and through the Cold War
era. Portrayals of British intelligence
as found in the popular fictions of
such authors as Bywater and Fleming
have provided many bread crumbs
for historians to penetrate classified
archival sources. Conversely, Bywater
and Fleming also are responsible for
overstating the capabilities of British
intelligence through such characters as
“Mr. X” and the more familiar Agent
007—Commander James Bond, RNVR.
By focusing on the original sources and
unclassified documentary evidence,
Boyd reassesses the genre of British
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intelligence to retrace the interrelationships between history and fiction.
On the other hand, Fleming’s character,
Bond, also worked very frequently with
an American counterpart, Felix Leiter.
Although Boyd avoids the temptation
of getting too bogged down in such
fictions, he restricts his analysis to
the British perspective. As a result,
his analysis sometimes is open to
additional debate concerning the role
of equivalent American intelligence
bureaucracies and the emergence of the
transatlantic “very special relationship”
in the world wars of the twentieth
century. This is understandable, as
British archives generally are better kept
and more accessible than American
collections. Boyd also has pressed the
limits with his more than 680 pages,
which include condensed endnotes
that are not very user-friendly.
On the other hand, Boyd very likely
left much on the cutting-room floor
to conform to the more-recent trends
in the scholarly and commercial
publishing industry of the twentyfirst century. Thankfully, this book
is not written to be read best on an
electronic device; it also is not written
for delivery in a podcast format.
Given some looming questions concerning the history of British intelligence,
Boyd has provided many very substantial conclusions that historians, policy
makers, and naval-service practitioners
must consider. This book should be
required reading for all contemporary
students of history. Although the future
is yet to be written, Boyd has provided
a very important contribution to the
historiography of British intelligence,
maritime strategy, and naval operations.
DAVID A. KOHNEN
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